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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 







BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with theft of a firearm 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1977), 
a felony of the second degree, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
{Supp. 1977). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the 
l~norable J. Robert Bullock sentenced the defendant 
to a term in the Utah State Prison of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the judgment rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant and Mark Myers were runaways 
from the "halfway house" prison facility (T.20). 
The defendant, Mark Myers, and Myers' fiancee, 
Holly, took an automobile, food, and some firearms 
into the mountains to "hide out" from the police 
(T.23-27). Mark gave the defendant permission to 
take his car to visit some girls if he promised to 
return by 5:00 o'clock (T.l5-l6). The defendant did 
not return by 5:00 o'clock that evening, or by the 
following morning, so Mark walked from the campsite 
and found the defendant at a laundromat in Payson 
(T.l6-17). Mark discovered that a citizen's band 
radio had been taken from the car (T.l7). The 
defendant told Mark that it had been stolen when he 
was repairing a flat tire on the car (T .18). Mark 
later learned that a rifle had been taken from the 
trunk of the car (T.l7). The rifle was recovered from 
the shop where defendant had pawned it, along with the 
radio and other items taken from the car (T.l8-19,38-39, 
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51-52). The defendant admitted pawning the-rifle 
without permission because he had no other means of. 
obtaining .money (T.47,69). The defendant testified 
the money was needed to buy food (T.69-70). 
Defendant's claimed error on appeal is 
that evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs was 
improperly admitted. The facts surrounding this 
claimed error are as follows: 
After the prosecutor's opening .statement, 
defendants moved for a mistrial on two grounds: (1) 
the prosecutor stated that the defendant had been in 
the "halfway house" before the offense was committed, 
implying he had been convicted of another crime, and 
(2) the prosecutor stated that other items had been 
taken from the car in addition to the rifle (T.7-8). 
The court denied the motion for a mistrial. 
Mark testified that he had first met the 
defendant at the Utah State Prison, and defendant 
objected "on the basis of my former motion." (T.ll). 
The court stated that defendant had a standing objection 
and overruled the objection (T.ll). The prosecutor then 
asked Mark about certain girls, and Mark answered that 
they were runaways (T.l2). Defendant moved to strike 
lhc answer. Id. 
-3-
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The Court answered: 
"THE COURT: Well, perhaps 
I could handle it this way, that 
by instructing the Jury now that 
the only question that is before 
you for resolution is whether or 
not on September 9, 1977 the 
defendant Kelvin Taylor stole a 
firearm. • • And any of the other 
testimony is just strictly by way 
of background, had no bearing upon 
the question as to whether or not 
Mr. Taylor d~d. But the Court 
rules that it is necessary for 
you to have an understanding of 
how the situation developed so that 
you can decide the ultimate question 
as to whether or not Mr. Taylor did 
as the state charges. And only for 
that purpose do I permit these 
questions, Mr. Carter." (T.l2-13). 
The defendant's counsel stated that he did not want to 
interrupt again, and ask8d if he could have a standi~ 
objection. The court st0ted: 
"THE COURT: Yes, you may, 
absolutely. You have it. I'll 
not permit him to go further than 
to just give us all a picture as 
to the actual situation, so that 
the Jury can focus on the -- properly 
focus on the ultimate question as to 
whether or not the theft occurred." 
(T.l3). 
After this point in the trial, there were oo 
further objections to questions or motions to strike 
witnessPs' answers, but further testimony was given 
-4-
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that tended to imply that defendant had committed 
crimes. Mark was asked about the events of a certain 
day, and he replied that "the defendant went out and 
siphoned gas for us." (T.lS). Evidence that the 
defendant had stolen items other than the rifle 
from Mark's car was received (T.l7-18). Mark was 
asked what he had done after finding the gun in the 
pawn shop, and he answered that he called the police 
and that the police had told him that they had 
a warrant for the defendant's arrest for escape from 
the halfway house (T.20). On cross-examination, Mark 
testified that he and the defendant had planned to 
poach wild game (T.25). Detective Sargeant Frank 
Wall of the Utah County Sheriff's Department testified 
as to certain conversations he had with the defendant. 
The prosecutor asked Wall if he had inquired about the 
rifle, and Wall answered: 
"Yes: I asked him, I said, 
'Kelvin, you realize that this 
would violate you, being in 
possession and doing this with 
the firearm?' And he said, 'Yes.' 
I asked him if his probation officer 
had been notified, and he said, 'No.' 
So at that time we called his proba-
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Wall was then asked to relate another 
conversation with the d2fendant, and he testified: 
"We had talked about his being involved in the situ::~­
tion, and I asked !1r. 'l'aylor why he would want to violate 
his parole and ·take the chance again. • • " (T.49). 
Finally, \\Tall related a conversation he had 
with the defendant at the time of his arrest when the 
defendctnt stated, "Well, I guess this will put me 
back in prison." (T.SO). Wall testified that he "had 
helped him (the defendant) out in previous (occasions?) 
and I felt that he hadn't been honest to me •••• " 
(T.S0-51). 
At the close of the State's case, defendant 
renewed his motion for a mistrial, and the court deni~ 




THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF OTHER CRIHES. 
A. EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD STOLEN OTHER 
ITEHS AT THE 'riHE AND PLACE OF THE THEFT CHJ\RGED IN THE 
INFOR1'1ATICN WAS PROPERLY ADHI'l'TED BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVX; 
TO ESTABLISH A COM1'10N PLAN OR SCHEt'lE. 
-6-
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Utah Rules of Evidence 55 provide that 
evido0ce of other crimes is admissible when relevant 
to prc,re a common plan or scheme. State v. Schieving, 
535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975); State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 
775 (Utah 1977). Evidence that the defendant had 
taken items other than the rifle from the car and 
pawned them at the same shop is relevant to prove a 
common plan or scheme to commit thefts of items from 
Mark Myers' car in order to obtain money. Respondent 
submits that evidence of-the other thefts falls within 
Rule 55, and the Cauble and Schieving cases, supra, 
and was properly admitted by the court below. 
B. THE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION, AND THE 
COl';\'Er~SP~.TION SURROUNDING DEFENDANT 1 S ADMISSION, WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Officer Wall's testimony that the defendant 
stated in his presence, "Well, I guess this will put 
me back in prison" (T.30), was admissible hearsay 
because it was an admission. Utah Rules of Evidence 
63(6). The statement was also admissible, even though 
it te~ded to show commission of another offense, 
because it was relevant to prove guilty knmvledge. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 55. 
-7-
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"Statements admitting a crime by one not 
under arrest are admissible. The fact that he 
admitted other crimes at the same time does not 
render the statement inadmissible." Lamberson v. State, 
504 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Crim. 1974). The case of 
\'looley v. People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1962), is in 
point. In Wooley, the court allowed the defendant's 
entire confession into evidence even though it implied 
that defendant had been in prison, because the 
co~fession was voluntary and in response to a proper 
question. In this case, defendant's admission, "1-vell, 
I guess this will put me back in prison" (T.30), 
was spontaneous and voluntary. 
Defendant's other admissions to Officer Nall 
were also admissible, and because they were admissib~, 
the jury was entitled to hear the conversational context 
in which they occurred, even though Officer 1-vall' s 
questions implied that defendant was a probationer or 
parolee. "It is settled law that where a conversat~n 
is inquired into it is not error to elicit the entire 
conversation even though, in this fashion, such conversa· 
tion incidentally reveals the commir;sion of another offe· 
People v. Howard, 334 P. 2d 105, 113 (Cal.l\pp. 1959) · 
-8-
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Respondent submits that defendant's admissions, and the 
conversations in which they occurred, were relevant and 
material to prove the offense charged, and the fact that 
they implied that defendant had been convicted of other 
crimes did not render them incompetent. 
C. EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD ESCAPED FROM 
A PRISON FACILITY, AIDED RUNAWAYS, AND SIPHONED GASOLINE 
WAS PROPERLY .ADMITTED TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUH.ROUNDING THE! CRIME AND TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIVE. 
In State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 329, 495 
P.?i 1265, 1267 (1972), this Court explained that 
"relevant evidence is admissible for the purpose of 
explaining the circumstances surrounding the crime of 
which the defendant stands accused; and the fact that 
it may tend to connect the defendant with another crime 
will not render the evide;1ce incompetent." In this case, 
the defendant escaped from a prison facility, and 
the flight to a mountain campsite, the theft of 
gasoline, and the pawning of the stolen rifle to obtain 
money for food were all connected because they related 
to defendant's attempt to elude the authorities. If 
the jury had not heard evidence of defendant's escape, 
-9-
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his actions would seen unconnected and inexplicable. 
The court below ruled that "it is necessary for you 
[the jury] to have an understanding of how the 
situa·tion developed so that you can declde the ultimate 
question. (T.l3). Respondent submits that this 
ruling is correct because the seemingly unrelated other 
offenses are, in reality, bound together by the single 
transaction of defendant's attempt to escape and elude 
capture. This attempt to escape provided the motive 
for defendant's theft: the charge in issue. Evidence 
of other offenses relevant to prove motive are admissiblt. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 55. In a prosecution for theft 
of a car, evidence of defendant's recent escape from the 
county jail is admissible to prove motive and as part of I 
the res gestae. Fleming v. State, 536 P.2d 986 (Okla. Cn•l 
1975). Evidenc2 of theft of an automobile is admissilik • 
in a prosecuti m for escape, State_v. Courville, 38/ P,2c 
938 (Wash. 1973), and evidence thai a defendant wa~ 
arrested in a stolen car is admissible in a burgla~:· 
prosecution. People v. Robinson, 240 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. 
App. 1968). Admission of this type of evidence is 
governed by the "complete story" test that allows t~ 
jury to hear all of the evidence surrounding an alleg~ 
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State v. Allen, 111 Ariz. 546, 535 P.2d 3 (1975). 
Respondent sub,'lits that the evidence submitted to the 
jury was relevant to an explanation of the.circumstances 
surrounding the offense and to the defendant's motive. 
POlNT II 
ASSUMING THAT EVIDENCE OF OTHER OFFENSES WAS 
IHPROPERLY ADMITTED, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND DOES 
NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
The evidence of defendant's guilt is over-
whelming. Defendant confessed that he had taken the 
rifle witho~t permission to do so (T.47,69). The 
defendant was identified by the pawnbroker, and the 
defendant's signature was on the pawn ticket (T.38,39). 
The defendant offered a false explanation to Mark when 
other thefts from the car were discovered (T.l8). This 
Court should not reverse unless the judgment below would 
have been different but for the error. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953). In view of the evidence, the judgment 
and verdict could not have been otherwise. The possibility 
of prejudicP was substantially lessened by the judge's 
cautionary instruction that evidence of other offenses 
" ••• is just strictly by way of background, had no 
b~3ring upon the question as to whether or not Mr. Taylor 
-11-
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did [commit the offense]" (T.l2-13). The possibility 
of prejudice \vas further reduced by the fact that the 
most damaging evidence relating to prior convictions 
could have been brought out anyway \vhen the defendant 
tJok the stand in his own behalf and was therefore 
required to ans\ver previous felony convictions. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1953); State v. Bennett, 30 Utah~ 
343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973); and Utah Rules of Evidence U 
It would be particularly unjust to reverse the convictio,, 
in this case where nearly all of the offensive evidence 
\-Tas introduced, not by an improper question, but because 
it was volunteered by an overzealous or non-responsive 
witness. Respondent submits that the evidence of guilt 
is overwhelming and the prejudice from the claimed error, 
if any, was slight. 
CONCLUSION 
Respo;tdent submits that evidence of other 
offenseo; \-,as p:copcrly admitted to prove plan, motive or 
guilty knowled<Je JJy i'tn adm_;_ssion. If any error is found 
in the admission of this evidence, respondent submits 
that it is harmless. Acc·>rdingly, respondent asks this 
-12-
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Court to affirm the judgment rendered below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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